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Expert Evidence on Battered Woman
Syndrome as a Basis for Proving
Justification in the Use of Deadly Force
When Evidence Indicates Defendant is
Victim of Abuse: Commonwealth v.
Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 555 A.2d 772
(1989).*
In Commonwealth v. Stonehouse,1 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania2 overturned the defendant's conviction for killing her former
boyfriend, concluding that the defendant's trial counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to present expert testimony regarding the battered
woman syndrome.' Although the issue was not raised on appeal,4 the
* In order to reward outstanding legal writing, the staff of the Dickinson Law Review
has elected to publish annually one casenote submitted in the Dickinson Law Review Summer
Casenote Writing Competition. Melissa A. Lengyel, 1989-90 Notes Editor, conducted the
research associated with this note.
1. 521 Pa. 41, 555 A.2d 772 (1989).
2. Justice Larsen delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Justices Flaherty, Zap-
pala, Papadakos, and Stout. Justice Zappala filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Fla-
herty joined. Chief Justice Nix filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice McDermott joined.
3. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 65, 555 A.2d at 785. The court also concluded that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to request proper jury instructions on self-defense and volun-
tary manslaughter. Id. at 61, 555 A.2d at 782. The court reasoned that the jury should have
been instructed to consider the cumulative effects of psychological and physical abuse. Id. at
60-61, 555 A.2d at 782.
4. The defendant's appellate counsel clearly stated that defendant's position on the self-
defense issue should not be "mischaracterized as a failure to raise the 'battered woman syn-
drome' issue." Id. at 67, 555 A.2d at 785 (Zappala, J., concurring). The amici made the only
reference in the briefs to the battered woman theory. Id.
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supreme court held that the absence of expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome was prejudicial to the defendant because it
allowed the jury to base the verdict on unfounded myths surrounding
the battered woman.5 The court effectively established the admissi-
bility of expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome to
justify the use of deadly force." Although not all jurisdictions agree
that such expert testimony is admissible,7 many courts have allowed
the use of expert evidence on the battered woman syndrome to estab-
lish the reasonableness of a defendant's claim of self-defense.8 Stone-
house appears to go one step further, permitting expert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome to expand the justification
for the use of deadly force in self-defense beyond traditional statu-
tory limits."
At her trial, Carol Stonehouse offered uncontradicted testimony
concerning the years of abuse she suffered at the hands of the victim,
William Welsh, her former boyfriend and former co-worker."0 On
5. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 66, 555 A.2d at 785. The court stated that "[a] battered
woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological be-
havior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern
for her rights." Id. at 61-62, 555 A.2d at 783 (quoting L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN at
xv (1979)). The court believed that the prosecutor improperly suggested to the jury that: (1)
battered women are generally masochists who enjoy being abused; (2) battered women are
uneducated, with few job skills; (3) battered women can be protected by the police; (4) bat-
tered women are free to leave the battering relationship at any time; and (5) battered women
suffer their beatings passively. Id. at 62-64, 555 A.2d at 783-84 (citing L. WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN 20, 23, 26).
6. Id. at 61, 555 A.2d at 783.
7. See 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (1986). Compare
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (inadmissible) and Burhle v.
State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981) (inadmissible as applied to facts of the case) with State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (admissible) and People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129,
488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (admissible). See generally Annotation, Admissibil-
ity of Expert or Opinion Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered Woman Syndrome, 18
A.L.R.4TH 1153 (1982).
8. See, e.g., State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); State v. Anaya,
438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981).
9. Although it is not clear that the plurality intended to recognize the battered woman
syndrome as a separate defense, the concurring and dissenting opinions interpreted the plural-
ity's holding to do precisely that. Justice Zappala stated, "1 would not address the second
issue of whether a separate defense referred to as 'battered woman syndrome' is recognizable
under the law of this Commonwealth." Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 66, 555 A.2d at 785 (Zappala,
J., concurring). Indeed, this observation suggests that the portion of the plurality opinion ad-
dressing the battered woman syndrome may not be binding, because only three of the seven
justices actually agreed with that portion of the opinion.
10. Id. at 44-45, 555 A.2d at 774. Stonehouse and Welsh were members of the Pitts-
burgh police force. During the three years prior to the shooting, Welsh's harassment and abuse
of Stonehouse became increasingly destructive. The abuse began with harassing phone calls
that occurred at least twenty times a day and progressed to acts of vandalism in which Welsh
regularly destroyed Stonehouse's clothing, apartment furnishings, and automobile. The harass-
ment ended with Welsh's continuous surveillance of Stonehouse, assaults on her person, and
threats of death. Id. at 44-45, 555 A.2d at 774-79.
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March 17, 1983, after enduring three years of constant harassment,
physical violence, and threats of death, Stonehouse shot and killed
Welsh from the balcony of her apartment, two floors above Welsh.11
At trial, Stonehouse's attorney made no attempt to introduce expert
evidence regarding the battered woman syndrome.' 2 The jury did not
believe that Stonehouse acted in self-defense, and found her guilty of
third degree murder.'
On appeal, 4 the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the
Commonwealth successfully disproved Stonehouse's claim of self-de-
fense'" because: (1) Welsh did not present a threat of imminent dan-
ger of death at the time of the shooting because he stood two floors
below Stonehouse and was in retreat; (2) the continuing relationship
that existed between Stonehouse and Welsh further indicated the
unreasonableness of Stonehouse's self-defense claim; and (3) Stone-
house was an experienced police officer trained to solve problems
without the use of unnecessary force. 6 The Superior Court also held
that Stonehouse's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise
the battered woman syndrome because Pennsylvania did not recog-
nize the syndrome as a viable defense in a case of homicide.'
Under current Pennsylvania law, deadly force may be used if
the actor honestly and reasonably believes such force is necessary to
protect against death or serious bodily injury.' 8 Prior case law recog-
11. Id. at 56, 555 A.2d at 780. Immediately prior to the shooting, Welsh broke into
Stonehouse's apartment, held a gun within six inches of her face, and told her she was going to
die. Welsh then beat Stonehouse with the gun. When Stonehouse managed to locate her own
gun, Welsh disappeared. Stonehouse stated that she stepped onto her balcony and saw Welsh
standing below pointing a gun up at her. Stonehouse claimed that she fired at Welsh in the
mistaken belief that Welsh had shot first. Id. at 55-56, 555 A.2d at 779-80.
12. Id. at 61, 555 A.2d at 782.
13. Id. at 56-57, 555 A.2d at 780. Stonehouse was sentenced to serve 7-14 years in jail.
Id. at 57, 555 A.2d at 780.
14. Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 358 Pa. Super. 270, 517 A.2d 540 (1986).
15. The Superior Court set forth the following test for self-defense:
To establish self-defense, the following elements must be shown: (I) the
slayer must have been free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty
which resulted in the killing; (2) the slayer must have reasonably believed that
he was in imminent danger of death, great bodily harm or some felony, and that
there was necessity to kill in order to save himself therefrom; and, (3) the slayer
must not have violated any duty of retreat to avoid the danger.
Id. at 278, 517 A.2d at 544 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 484 Pa. 71, 76-77, 398 A.2d
948, 951 (1979)).
16. Id. at 278, 517 A.2d at 544.
17. Id. The court further stated, however, that its opinion should not be construed as a
position on the validity of the battered woman syndrome. "We only state that in the present
evolution of the law it is not a recognized defense to homicide." Id. at 278 n.I, 517 A.2d at
544 n. I.
18. See Comment, The Battered Spouse Syndrome as a Defense to a Homicide Charge
Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 26 VILL. L. REv. 105, 123-24 (1980).
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nized that psychiatric testimony should be admitted to establish the
defendant's honest, subjective belief of imminent danger. 9 Pennsyl-
vania courts previously rejected the use of psychiatric testimony to
prove the reasonableness of the defendant's belief, however, because
the peculiarities of a given defendant are irrelevant to the Pennsylva-
nia standard, which is objective.2 0 Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court required courts to take into account special circum-
stances in analyzing the reasonableness of a wife's belief of immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily injury from her husband.21
These special circumstances included a history of spousal abuse, the
wife's familiarity with her husband's past behavior, and changes in
the husband's behavior toward his wife immediately prior to the
killing.
21
The Pennsylvania Superior Court followed this holding in Com-
monwealth v. Grove,23 in which an abused woman killed her husband
while he was sleeping.24 The court added, however, that the history
of spousal abuse is merely one factor to be considered in determining
the honesty and reasonableness of the accused's fear; it does not al-
ter the requirement that the deadly force be "immediately necessary
...on the present occasion ' 26 in order to make self-defense an is-
sue.2 6 The court refused to extend the statutory limit on the use of
deadly force simply because the defendant was a battered women.27
In this context, the Stonehouse decision will likely have a great im-
pact on the criminal prosecution of battered spouses. This is pre-
cisely the context in which admissibility of expert testimony regard-
ing the battered woman syndrome has created such a controversy in
other jurisdictions.
Although some courts have held that the battered woman syn-
drome is scientifically undeveloped and inconclusive, and therefore
inadmissible as expert evidence,28 the emerging position supports the
19. Id. at 123.
20. Id.
21. Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 472-73, 431 A.2d 949, 952 (1981).
22. Id. (no issue was raised regarding the use of expert evidence to help the defendant
establish a self-defense claim).
23. 363 Pa. Super. 328, 526 A.2d 369, appeal denied, 517 Pa. 630, 539 A.2d 810
(1987).
24. Id. at 331, 526 A.2d at 371.
25. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 505(a) (Purdon 1983).
26. Grove, 363 Pa. Super. at 336, 526 A.2d at 373.
27. Id. at 336, 526 A.2d at 373.
28. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981); Burhle v.
State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981). See generally Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and
Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986) (criticizing method-
ology used by researchers of the battered woman syndrome).
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use of such testimony as scientifically reliable and relevant to an ac-
cused's claim of self-defense. The issue then becomes how the jury
should consider such expert evidence.
This question is difficult to analyze because some courts have
based decisions regarding the self-defense claims of battered women
on fine semantic distinctions. In State v. Kelly, 0 for example, the
court held that expert testimony could not be used to show that a
battered woman might believe her life to be in danger when indeed it
was not and when no reasonable person would have so believed. 1
The court stated that an expert could inform the jury that the de-
fendant suffered from battered woman syndrome and could explain
the syndrome in detail, relating its characteristics to the defendant,
but only to assist the jury in determining the honesty and reasona-
bleness of the defendant's belief. 2 The expert may explain how a
battered defendant might reasonably fear harm yet remain with her
husband,3 3 but the expert may not usurp the jury's function of deter-
mining whether the defendant's actual belief was in fact
reasonable.3 4
The Stonehouse court agreed that the jury must apply an objec-
tive standard, but altered the definition of that standard. If trial
counsel had introduced evidence of the battered woman syndrome,
the jury would have weighed Stonehouse's actions in light of how the
reasonably prudent battered woman would have perceived and re-
acted to Welsh's behavior.35 Although the court tried to maintain an
objective standard, Stonehouse essentially creates a class for bat-
tered women that is separate from other defendants claiming self-
defense. 6 The reasonable battered woman, not the reasonable man,
is the measuring stick by which the jury is to determine the reasona-
29. See. e.g., State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985); State v. Kelly, 97
N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
30. 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
31. Id. at 204, 478 A.2d at 377.
32. Id. at 207, 478 A.2d at 378. Cf. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 133, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (expert testimony would assist jury in understanding
unique pressures that are part and parcel of battered woman's life, and would enable jury to
disregard prior conclusions as being common myths).
33. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d at 133, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
34. Id. at 135, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 363. See also Kelly, 97 N.J. at 207, 478 A.2d at 378.
35. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 65, 555 A.2d at 784. Cf. State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461,
467, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (1985) (supporting use of objective test of the reasonably prudent
battered woman).
36. Cf. Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense. A Legal and Empiri-
cal Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 626 n.30 (citing Vaughn & Moore, The Battered Spouse
Defense in Kentucky, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 399, 399 (1983)) (suggesting that defense of battered
women is slowly developing a unique style that is similar to, but distinct from, self-defense and
diminished capacity).
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bleness of the defendant's beliefs and actions. Although this standard
does not take into consideration the individual defendant's idiosyn-
crasies,87 it does recognize the uniqueness of battered women as a
class and offers them a tailor-made defense.38
The court did not merely uphold the admissibility of expert tes-
timony on the battered woman syndrome, however.39 The court
stated that when a pattern of battering has been shown, the battered
woman syndrome must be presented to the jury through the intro-
duction of relevant evidence.4 0 This in itself is a giant step away
from the prior law of Pennsylvania.4' This requirement is also impor-
tant because it forces a defendant's counsel to pursue the battered
woman syndrome as a defense or risk being branded ineffective by
the courts of Pennsylvania.
This definitive language distinguishes the Stonehouse decision
from prior cases that seem similar in theory but are actually dissimi-
lar in effect. One such case is State v. Stewart,4 2 in which the Su-
preme Court of Kansas overturned a jury's finding that a battered
woman acted in self-defense when she killed her sleeping husband.43
The Stewart court approved the reasonably prudent battered wife
test to measure the reasonableness of the defendant's belief of immi-
nent danger in asserting self-defense."" The court added, however,
that the law of self-defense is no more generous to a battered woman
than to any other defendant claiming self-defense. 45 Battered woman
syndrome is not a defense to murder,' and there must be a showing
of imminent threat before a jury will be instructed on self-defense. 4
For this reason, the court concluded that an instruction on self-de-
fense was not warranted. 48 To hold that it could be reasonable to kill
a sleeping victim would be to permit the execution of an abuser for
37. See State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 659, 763 P.2d 572, 585 (1988) (Herd, J.,
dissenting).
38. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 61, 555 A.2d at 783.
40. Id. at 66, 555 A.2d at 785. The plurality reasoned that expert testimony was essen-
tial to the fair defense of a battered defendant "because of the unique psychological condition
of the battered woman and because of the myths commonly held about battered women." Id.,
555 A.2d at 785.
41. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
42. 243 Kan. 639, 763 P.2d 572 (1988).
43. Id. at 649, 763 P.2d at 579.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 646, 763 P.2d at 577.
47. Stewart, 243 Kan. at 646, 763 P.2d at 577. See also State v. Norman, 324 N.C.
253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989); Commonwealth v. Grove, 363 Pa. Super. 328, 526 A.2d 369, appeal
denied, 517 Pa. 630, 539 A.2d 810 (1987).
48. Stewart, 243 Kan. at 648, 763 P.2d at 579.
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past or future acts.49
If the Stonehouse rule is applied to the facts of Stewart, it is
not clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reach the
same conclusion as its Kansas counterpart. The court, in Common-
wealth v. Grove,50 stated that the use of deadly force must be justi-
fied by a showing that the deadly force is "immediately necessary
. . . on the present occasion." 51 The Stonehouse court stated, how-
ever, that "expert testimony regarding battered women is admissible
as the basis for proving justification in the use of deadly force where
the defendant has been shown to be a victim of psychological and
physical abuse."' 52 This language does not clearly indicate that the
Stonehouse plurality intends the battered woman syndrome to oper-
ate as a separate defense.53 It does appear to suggest, however, that
if the evidence presented at trial reveals the defendant to be a victim
of abuse, the jury should be allowed to decide, based on expert testi-
mony regarding the battered woman syndrome, whether the defend-
ant reasonably believed her use of deadly force to be immediately
necessary.54 This contradicts the results in Stewart and Grove, in
which the courts determined the necessity of deadly force before al-
lowing submission of the expert evidence to the jury.5
Although the ramifications of Stonehouse are currently unclear,
the decision is certain to have an immediate impact by causing a
significant increase in the number of defendants claiming self-de-
fense. The effects will be widespread, and will not be limited to
Pennsylvania. The plurality's language suggests that the principles of
justification may be extended in certain cases to allow a jury to con-
done the offensive use of deadly force in self-defense, such as when a
battered woman kills her sleeping husband. The potential ramifica-
tions of such an interpretation of this decision will require future
litigation in order to establish some control over the power of the
jury in the criminal justice system. Courts must set limits to ensure
that the imminence requirement of the self-defense statute is not
sidestepped by a jury sympathetic to an abused defendant's pitiable
49. Id.
50. 363 Pa. Super. 328, 526 A.2d 369, appeal denied, 517 Pa. 630, 539 A.2d 810
(1987).
51. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
52. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 61, 555 A.2d at 783.
53. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
54. "Where a person believes she must kill or be killed and there is the slightest basis in
fact for this belief, it is a question for the jury as to whether the danger was imminent."
Stewart, 243 Kan. at 659, 763 P.2d at 585 (Herd, J., dissenting).
55. See supra notes 24-26, 42-49 and accompanying text.
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circumstances. If courts do not beware, the jury may allow any de-
fendant who has suffered some anguish at the hands of his or her
victim to literally get away with murder.
Gayle P. Lafferty
